Abstract: This paper examines institutions as a determinant of external debt. We employ a recently constructed data set on institutions for Nigeria, which is constructed using a different methodology from the oft used polity series and also unbundles institutions into several sub-categories. The results show that specific institutional categories such as 'the extent of arbitrary executive powers' and 'government secrecy' play a significant role in limiting debt levels. Furthermore, when we consider the composite institutions' measure that captures the totality of civil and political liberties, the empirical analysis suggests that it plays a significant role in limiting the levels of long-term external debt, as well as public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt, in the long-run.
Introduction
Why do some countries always seem to be engulfed in unsustainable debt and edging towards a debt crisis, while other similar countries are not? Why is debt incurred by a resource-rich country like Nigeria classified as bad debt, while debt incurred by a relatively less resource-rich country like Sweden is not classified as bad debt? More importantly, why does it seem that, despite efforts by some policymakers to clear out incidences of bad debt, certain countries always manage to find themselves back in the same stranglehold of a debt crisis? This study looks at the role of institutional factors in the narrative countries such as Nigeria that continue to accumulate debt despite a substantial endowment of natural resources.
External debt is defined as all public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt, as well as private non-guaranteed debt. This includes international monetary fund (IMF) credits and other forms of short-term debt. It is understandable that many developing countries suffer from the often referenced investment-savings gap and thus have a need to fill this gap either through foreign direct investment (FDI) or through external debt financing (Lewis, 1954) . This, it has been said, would help build infrastructure, increase investment, and, ultimately, facilitate the projection of a developing economy or an emerging-market economy to a sustainable-development stage. In this sense, external debt in and of itself is not necessarily a problem, but rather becomes a problem when certain thresholds in levels of external finance have been crossed. In an assessment of external debt accumulation in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Akanbi (2016) identifies to a certain extent what this threshold is. In any case, the crux of the matter is that external debt can be thought of as a U-shaped phenomenon, that is, as it increases it can be beneficial to the growth and development of an economy, but, once it passes a certain threshold, it stops being beneficial to the economy. However, it must be kept in mind that, with excessive borrowing, the likelihood of countries being unable to pay or service their debt becomes a reality, thus leading to negative financial and economic adjustments (Fosu, 1999 (Fosu, , 2010 .
External finance in the form of PPG debt as well as private debt has been used as an instrument to close the investment-savings gap by developing countries for many years. This is more often the case when countries struggle to meet their current account requirements, or lack the necessary foreign reserves to carry on their ongoing import and export activities. This makes the role of foreign finance a necessary aspect of accelerated growth by relieving individual countries of some of these constraints, and, in particular, the constraints brought about by a lack of adequate domestic savings, and hence finance (Chenery and Strout, 1966; Griffin, 1970; Papanek, 1973; Hansen, 2004; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) . This philosophy led many countries to source external finance in order to close this gap and hence meet their development-growth targets. This was the approach many sub-Saharan African countries employed in the 1980s in tandem with the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) introduced by the IMF. Factors such as lack of fiscal discipline, corruption, and, of importance to this study, the lack of adequate institutions to convert such loans into tangible positive economic returns, prevented these loans from being converted to accelerated and sustainable growth.
In contrast to the growth-inducing external finance argument, there is the argument that external debt negatively impacts economic growth (Foxley, 1987; Boone, 1994 Boone, , 1996 , the basic premise being that foreign aid or external finance tends to crowd out domestic savings. As such, it tends to be a stopgap fix leading to the return and proliferation of the same economic issues the moment the external finance ceases, as well as leading to some form of debt cycle (Nishimura and Ohyama, 1995) . Consequently, the literature is relatively divided regarding the impact of external finance. Alternatives to external finance that are potentially less detrimental have been suggested, such as internal sourcing of finance, resource aid in the form of human capital, and skills training, instead of measures such as PPG debt, and austerity measures (Claessens, 1993) . This debate is, however, not the focus of the present paper. Rather, the focus is on exploring the role that institutions play in determining the external debt and financing behaviour of a developing country (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2009) .
Unsustainable debt levels have been the experience of many countries in SSA. Akanbi (2016) highlights that, in the 1970s, sub-Saharan African countries averaged external PPG debt of about 80% of gross domestic product (GDP). By 2012, that percentage had only dropped to about 68%. This in itself does not signal a detrimental situation, since many developed Western countries maintain PPG debt levels higher than 100% of their GDP. However, SSA differs from this in that the majority of such accumulated debt has not been translated into development locally. In fact, what occurred on the continent between 1970 and 1990 was a period where the average African country suffered its worst spate of economic performance. Therefore, it can be argued that much of this debt was used to finance government recurrent spending or was corruptly mismanaged, rather than being used for investment and infrastructure development that would lead to long-term economic growth and development.
Understanding the proliferation of debt in many less developed countries requires an examination of the reasons for such proliferation. One argument is that international loans were relatively affordable in nature during the 1970s, and that this led to countries taking up excessive external finance. However, the current wave of international loans contradicts this argument, as the price of loans and the conditions they come with are far less favourable and thus the loans are now less affordable. Another argument speaks of the corrupt nature of governance and political leadership over the years in SSA. Fortunately, many sub-Saharan countries experienced enormous growth from the mid-1990s up until 2012-2013. The harsh economic climates of the past few years caused by the fall in commodity prices has meant that most sub-Saharan African countries that failed to invest in infrastructure and to diversify their economies are hard-hit by this. The result is that there has been a shortfall in savings; hence a resurfacing of the investment-savings gap (Arezki and Brückner, 2012) . Consequently, these countries are now seeking some form of external debt financing to absorb these shocks. The main concern, here, is that many of these countries still have an institutional environment that is not conducive to ethical external financing. The levels of fiscal discipline that such institutional environments engender are not good enough to accommodate and ensure that external debt financing is adequately used within these countries. Therefore, it is plausible that SSA might fall back into the same debt crisis it experienced in the 1980s.
The Nigerian debt story is no different from that of SSA as a whole -in fact, Nigeria typifies it (Rutledge et al., 2012) . Nigeria was the most indebted country in Africa before its debt deal with the Paris Club in 2005. Even though debt was still owed to other financial institutions such as the World Bank, this was relatively small in comparison with the Paris Club loan. Nigeria's debt was estimated to be around USD 35 billion at the time. To highlight the need for concern, Nigeria's current external debt stands at USD 10.1 billion, whereas, after the debt forgiveness/consolidation of 2005, it had fallen to a mere USD 3.5 billion. The absolute value does not tell the whole story. Nigeria's debt in the early 1980s stood at about 10% of GDP, but ballooned to about 120% of GDP by 1987, and increased further to about 160% of GDP in the mid-1990s following the second oil-price drop. However, this value fell gradually with the recovery of oil prices in the 2000s up until the debt forgiveness of [2004] [2005] . In fact, by 2003, the ratio had fallen back to about 78% (Bandiera, 2008) . With the current spate of bond issuance by sub-Saharan African countries (a total of about USD 15 billion was issued between 2006 and 2014) and the current economic difficulties due to falling commodity prices, one wonders if this current debt stock value will not continue to increase at an even faster pace (Sy, 2015) .
In the debt and development literature, many variables have been explored as possible explanations for, or determinants of, whether or not a country falls into a debt crisis due to its debt levels. These variables have included phenomena such as the level of development of capital markets or financial development, debt levels, the history of the occurrence of debt crises, foreign reserves, the political economy, attraction of FDI, liquidity, and revenue from exports, among others (Akanbi, 2016) . Only a few studies in the literature have considered the political economy or institutional aspects. Much of the literature has often focused on cross-country debt-accumulation attributes in SSA. However, in order to arrive at more specific and in-depth country conjectures, country specific analysis of the role of some of these variables in determining debt levels become pertinent.
A trivial assessment of the causes of debt would put the main determinant of excess debt accrual in a developing country like Nigeria down to corruption. However, this is not informative for purposes of policy recommendation. In addition, the fact that debt accrual is a common phenomenon across both developing and developed economies, means that one cannot attribute it to corruption alone. The extent of the debt owed by a country covers a wide range of factors and the trend seems to indicate that less-developed countries (LDCs) have a relatively lower debt to GDP ratio than most developed countries. Lastly, given the theoretical backing for the use of external finance as an instrument for development investment, and hence a means to meet capital/investment requirements necessary to achieve accelerated growth targets, corruption ceases to be the only plausible explanation for excess debt levels.
A number of cross-country studies have extensively investigated the determinants of debt. It is therefore not surprising that numerous variables in the literature have been found to significantly determine debt levels in countries. Sinha et al. (2011) found evidence which suggests that economic growth, the level of the current-account balance, inflation, as well as FDI all impact sovereign debt (public debt). This suggests a bidirectional relationship between growth and debt -a relationship that is often ignored in many empirical investigations of the debt and growth relationship. FDI is peculiar in that it is often suggested to developing countries as an alternative to taking up external finance to meet local objectives. This means that FDI can play a two-pronged role in determining debt levels in a country: on the one hand, it reduces the extent of debt levels in a country, and, on the other, it provides some of the investment that a country is seeking in order to meet its capital and growth targets. Government expenditure is often cited as one of the main variables that impact a country's debt level, the idea being that, as a country grows, its income levels increase as well, and so do the demands on the part of its citizens. This means that demand from both the private and public sector increase together with these demands. Consequently, greater demands will be made of government to spend on infrastructure and to deliver services in line with the new income levels. This creates a situation which, if not well managed, will lead to financial constraints on the government and the need to venture into the global market in order to meet government expenditure requirements (Stegarescu, 2013) .
The aim of this study is therefore to examine more critically the role institutions play in keeping the government in check, in as far as public debt levels are concerned. Using Nigeria as a case study, we will employ a comprehensive set of institutional data and look at the nature of external debt financing in Nigeria. This will help inform (if not change) the approach to debt accumulation. Furthermore, it will help identify which types of institutions, or subcategories of institutions, are most important for debt determination in Nigeria.
The remainder of the study is arranged as follows: the next section (section 2) provides a brief literature review. Then, Section 3 and 4 discuss the data and the empirical approach, respectively, while Section 5 contains an analysis of the results. The final section (Section 6) contains our concluding remarks.
Some stylised facts on public debts and external debts are necessary to put this paper in context. Total external debt in the context of this paper is inclusive of both public and private debt. Therefore, the impact of institutions on the two might differ. It is often the case in studies in the literature that external debt is either referring to total external debt, which is inclusive of public external debt, (as is the case in this paper), or to only public external debt. In either case, public external debt is captured and most likely highly correlated with the total external debt of a developing economy. The aim is therefore to assess the possible impact of both external debt and public external debt in the context of a developing country like Nigeria. Literature points to a diverse array of the macroeconomic effects of external debt. More specifically, Presbitero (2012) finds that the growth effects of public debt is negative up until it reaches about 90% of GDP, after which the effect becomes irrelevant. The study argues that this nonlinear effect may be explained by good macroeconomic policies, as well as stable institutions. These are two factors that are not often pushed for in Nigeria. Shabbir (2013) on the other hand, observed an inverse relationship between external debt and growth in the long-run. The study states that, while developing countries are often forced to use external funding to support limited domestic revenues, it is when the external sources found are used to generate productivity and employment that developing countries are stuck with lower tax revenues. These shortages in turn exacerbate the problem limited revenue. Such a cyclical relationship often leads to developing countries being stuck in a debt cycle, which eventually leads to the inevitable need for debt forgiveness as was the case in 2005.
Theoretical framework
There are various avenues through which debt levels can be influenced in a country. These can be economic, political, demographic or sociological. However, in the present context, the focus is on the political-institutional determinants of debt, with Nigeria as the case study. This is not an attempt to discount the roles and the importance of other variables, but rather an endeavour to explore extensively the role played by institutions in Nigeria's debt levels. Schragger (2012) argues that the solution to fiscal crises is largely a matter of politics, and not one of institutional design. That is, the practice by the incumbent government to take on often unsustainable financial commitments that are binding for future governments and tax payers is problematic. Such borrowing behaviour of a country can be seen as the government's willingness to take on decisions that will limit the future ability to earn income. Therefore, the role of governance, and hence the institutional environment in a country, is pivotal to the external financing strategy adopted.
One such avenue, as identified by Süssmuth and Von Weizsäcker (2006) , is the idea that the existence of a multiparty system in a country will mean that any efforts by the government to embark on budget reduction, and hence reduce the incidence of public debt accumulation, will be problematic because of party agendas. Even though there may be a collective desire to reduce the budget deficits, each individual party will still want allocations particular to them, to remain unchanged, leading to some form of prisoner's dilemma. This often leads to a continued need for external finance. Since Nigeria is an ethnocentric entity [see Fadiran (2015) ], the multiparty aspect of what has troubled many European countries might therefore be exhibited in the multi-ethnic system that permeates Nigerian governance. In addition to this, an incumbent party may take up external debt and relax its budget constraints at the end of its tenure in order to spend more and possible capture more votes during elections. This way, the credit market acts as a direct instrument for the government, and the government takes up a debt burden that will be borne by the taxpayers in the future without the government having to worry about repayment in the present term. In both instances, a good institutional environment, or an adjustment of the constitution to guard against such behaviour, would help lessen the likelihood of a potential public debt burden. Alesina and Tabellini (1989) frame their theory of debt and institutions in a similar way to the above, arguing that the incumbent polity will leave behind high levels of debt for the incoming party to pay in the future. Such a practice is possible when there are no institutional rules or guidelines in place to prevent it and avoid the financial constraints that will ensue.
This clearly highlights some of the ways in which institutions can play a role in either fostering or mitigating debt levels. Institutions are certainly not the only route through which debt can be determined for a country like Nigeria; other factors include non-oil primary deficits, oil revenues, real growth, real interest rate, real exchange rate, and foreign-reserve changes (Bandiera, 2008) . In a similar manner, these same variables (except for oil-related variables in non-resource-rich countries) have been found to play a significant role in the debt status of other indebted countries like Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Laos, Uganda and Vietnam. It must be noted, however, that the level and extent of influence of the different variables varied significantly from one variable to another, and between countries, which suggests that the way these different variables impact on debt is unique to each country. This underlines the need for a country-specific analysis of debt in addition to some of the already extensive cross-country analyses. These same variables are the ones we will use as a control in our analysis.
Data
The data used covers the period 1970 to 2015 for Nigeria, including the period during which Nigeria's debt ranged from as low as below 10% of GDP to above 200% of GDP. To capture as many attributes of debt as possible, we employ three different types of debt: total external debt relative to GDP; total public and publically guaranteed debt relative to GDP; and long-term external debt relative to GDP. The three variables are obtained from the data provided by the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).
The institutional variables used in the analysis are obtained from Fadiran (2015) . In this work, a comprehensive study of the evolution of institutions in Nigeria is carried out and data is constructed covering three distinct institutional aspects of Nigeria, namely: civil and political liberties, freehold property rights, and non-freehold (customary) property rights. The institutional index of concern here is that of civil and political liberties. It uses de jure laws and legislation, such as the constitutions, historical texts and colonial bluebooks, in constructing an index of de jure civil and political liberties for Nigeria.
1 Furthermore, in quantifying the quality of institutions, numerical scores are assigned to each sub-category if the researcher deems laws passed during a certain period curtail or promote any of the categories of institutions considered. These scores are limited to a maximum possible score, depending on how important the category is for either civil and political liberties, or property rights. All the subcategories are added up to form the composite index, civil and political liberties, with the maximum possible score being 100. However, individual sub-indicators can be used separately as well. To this end, we explore two sub-indicators that are most closely related to issues of debt: the extent of arbitrary executive powers and government secrecy. We also regress the civil and political liberties index as a composite measure of all the sub-indicators on debt. We anticipate that the relationship between all the institutional measures and debt should be a negative one, since the institutions measure increases with better laws being promulgated in the system.
In addition to the variables of interest in the present study, we control for some of the variables often linked to debt determination in the literature, such as interest payment on debt 2 , FDI, GDP growth, oil rent (this is peculiar to oil-producing countries), non-oil fiscal balance 3 , and foreign-exchange reserves. The need for a parsimonious model guided by the limited available data points requires us to limit the number of variables included in our model. Apart from the non-oil fiscal balance, all the control variables were obtained from the World Bank WDI data set, while the non-oil fiscal balance was obtained from Akanbi (2015) . All measures are captured as a ratio of GDP, except for growth rate and the institutional variables. In addition, natural logarithms have been applied to all the variables, except for non-oil fiscal balance, which has many negative observations. We anticipate a negative relationship between FDI inflows, growth and debt. FDI is often thought of in theory as a substitute for external finance. In a similar manner, a higher interest payment, which acts as the price of external finance, should discourage countries from pursuing more external finance. The relationship between the rest of the control variables, such as foreign reserves and non-oil fiscal balance, can be either positive or negative.
Empirical method and model
The choice of an estimation technique for our analysis is informed by the time-series properties of the data being used, the possible correlations between the variables employed (which might lead to issues of reverse causality and endogeneity), and the time span covered by the data. Our data covers the period 1970 to 2014, giving us T = 45, which qualifies as a large enough T for an estimation technique that makes use of both the autoregressive and distributive properties of a time series. Ideally, a few considerations need to be explored when deciding on an estimation technique. These include the memory of the time series and the order of integration. The first step is to determine whether or not the time series is stationary, and, if non-stationary, the second step is to determine the level of integration of the series. It is the information gathered from the tests that determine whether or not certain estimation techniques such as OLS, 2SLS, ECM and other oft-employed time-series regression techniques can be applied. If, for example, all variables being considered are stationary, then the OLS would be adequate. On the other hand, if all the variables are non-stationary and integrated of order one, then OLS in first-difference will be adequate for assessing short-run dynamics, while an estimate of the model using an error-correction model would provide a consistent analysis of long-run dynamics. However, if there is a mix of both stationary and non-stationary variables (integrated of order one), and we are interested in long-run dynamics, then none of the two techniques can be used to estimate the model. 
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Note: *, **, and ***Represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. P-values in italics. CVPL -civil and political liberties; ABITR -arbitrary executive powers; govt. sec -government secrecy; Payment 1 -interest payment on total external debt; Payment 2 -interest payment on public and publicly guaranteed external debt; Payment 3 -interest payment on long-term external debt; reserves -foreign reserves; NFB -non-oil fiscal balance.
We are, however, able to apply an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to such a model, assuming that the integrated variables are co-integrated. This method helps circumvent a problem that is often present in macroeconomic empirical analysis. It is often the case that growth data is stationary, whereas many other macroeconomic variables tend to be non-stationary, such as institutions, per capita income, and population. Such a situation often leaves the researcher with no option but to first-difference all the variables integrated of order one and estimate the model using OLS. This approach, while adequate, would mean regression analysis can only tease out short-run dynamics, thereby losing out on all the long-run information contained in the data. An estimation technique that allows for long-run dynamics to be teased out may be beneficial in such a scenario. The ARDL estimation technique possesses the attributes that allow for this. The ARDL estimation technique is used to determine whether or not a long-run relationship exists between the variables of interest as well as short-run dynamics. Within the approach, ARDL bounds-testing as developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2001) is used to ascertain the presence of a long-run relationship between variables consistently. This is more advantageous when the variables being considered are integrated of different orders between zero and one. In this capacity, the bounds-testing aspect of the ARDL is an alternative to the Johansen co-integration test of long-run co-movement.
The ARDL estimation technique is usually implemented in the form of ARDL (p; q). To ascertain whether indeed the ARDL is the right estimation technique, we perform a unit root test of all the variables employed. This is to check whether in fact the variables are stationary or not, and, if non-stationary, to ensure that they are integrated of a maximum order of one. The unit root test outcome is presented in Table 1 . In performing the unit root test, we employ two different methods: the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), developed by Im et al. (2003) , and the Fisher unit root test, developed by Phillips and Perron (1988) . As shown in table, almost all the variables considered are first-difference stationary, implying integration of order one. Only two of the variables are integrated of order zero (GDP growth and non-oil fiscal balance). In any case, this confirms that ARDL is an adequate estimation technique to use.
In addition to the unit root tests, we also perform a basic correlation analysis of the time series employed to assess the level of correlation that may exist between the variables. This will also further highlight the adequacy of ARDL for our analysis should there be a significant correlation between some of the variables, which is often the case when dealing with macroeconomic variables. We employ Spearman's rank correlation for this exercise. The results presented in Table 2 show that high levels of correlation indeed exist between some of the regressors. For example, we see high and significant correlations between FDI and foreign reserves, as well as between FDI and interest payment on debt. Therefore, care has to be taken to ensure no autocorrelation or endogeneity is influencing our regression results. The model that we estimate empirically takes the following form: 
where at time 't', 'Debt' is the specific debt component being considered, and 'a' is the intercept, and Inst t-i is the proxy for institutions, which in the case of this paper, could be either civil or political liberties, the extent of arbitrary executive powers or government secrecy. 'Z' is a vector of all other variables to be controlled; these would include GDP growth, interest payments, FDI, foreign reserves, oil rents, and non-oil fiscal balance. A few caveats need to be observed when estimating such a model. Since the variables being analysed are predominantly macroeconomic variables, concerns about autocorrelation become pertinent, and, in a similar vein, issues regarding endogeneity need to be accounted for. In this respect, the data used to capture institutions are de jure measures, meaning that macroeconomic noise contained in this measure is limited, thus limiting the extent of autocorrelation and potential endogeneity issues. Furthermore, the ARDL estimation technique employed helps limit potential endogeneity. Additionally, this study is unlike many of the studies in the literature in that it concerns itself with country-specific issues. Therefore, the number of observations available to perform our regression analysis is limited, thus requiring an estimation technique that would still produce consistent estimates given such limitations.
Results and discussion
The results of the ARDL estimations are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. In Table 3 , we look at the impact of institutions and some control variables relating to total external debt in Nigeria. Total external debt is measured as a ratio of GDP. In the data section, the expected sign for the institutional variables is negative, as informed by theory. Since the measure CVPL, which captures the totality of civil and political liberties, is expected to increases as the quality of institutions increase, we expect that, with better institutions, the debt level should decrease. In a similar manner, the two subcategories of CVPL -government secrecy and the extent of arbitrary executive powers -should also exhibit a negative long-run co-movement with debt levels. If we consider the results presented in Table 3 , we see in column 1 the results for the regression without including any of the institutional variables as a regressor. Only one of the variables -GDP growth -confirms theory. It is suggested that the remainder of the variables, namely FDI inflows, interest payments, and non-oil fiscal balance, have a positive impact on the level of debt. This is an interesting outcome for interest payments, which suggests that, as interest payments increase, debt levels also go up. This can also be as the result of a possible bidirectional relationship between debt and interest payments on such debt -that is, as debt levels increase, the interest paid on the debt will certainly increase as well.
In column 2 of Table 3 , we include the first measure of institutions, which is civil and political liberties -a composite measure of several sub-indicators that also include our two other institutional measures. The coefficient in respect of this measure is negative, which confirms theoretical expectations. However, it is insignificant. Many of the other control variables are now significant, with the exception of oil rents. In the subsequent columns (columns 3 to 5) of Table 3 , we look at the two other institutional measures of interest. In column 3, we regress government secrecy, while, in column 4, the extent of arbitrary executive powers is included, and, finally, in column 5, both measures are regressed on debt. The results indicate no long-run, significant co-movement or influence of either government secrecy or arbitrary executive powers on debt. However, in the fifth column, where both institutional variables are controlled, the extent of arbitrary executive powers does have a negative and significant long-term influence on the level of debt. This is in accordance with what is anticipated based on theory.
Table 3
Total external debt and institutions Notes: *, **, and ***Represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The critical value bounds for the F-statistics are: 2.33 -3.25, 2.63 -3.62, 3.27 -4.39, for K = 6; 2.22 -3.17, 2.5 -3.5, 3.07 -4.23, for K = 7; 2.13 -3.09, 2.38 -3.41, 2.93 -4.06, for K = 8. The first value being the lower bound and the second value is the upper bound. ECM coeff. (error correction model coefficients), gives the error correction term for the model, which indicates that the model is okay, and measures the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium. In all the cases, we have significance at the 1% level of significance. A look at the graphical movement of the two (debt and the extent of arbitrary executive powers) in Figure 1 confirms this and shows that their movement is countercyclical. Government secrecy, on the other hand, has a positive coefficient, albeit insignificant. This may point to the fact that debt in itself is not a negative phenomenon, and that there can be 'good debt'. Historically, however, it is well-documented that most of the debt accumulated by Nigeria over the past 40 to 50 years has not been directed towards development projects. It is therefore puzzling that in column 5, curtailing of the extent of arbitrary executive powers seems to lead to increased debt levels. Another potential explanation could be that, because of a reduction of secrecy, debt that had been kept secret in the past is now being reported.
In the introduction and literature-review sections, we highlighted some of the avenues through which debt in a country can be linked to institutions and the country's political economy. One of the identified avenues was through unchecked powers whereby the leaders or ruling party take up debt that will have to be paid off by the future taxpayers. It is through this avenue that the extent of arbitrary executive powers comes into play. Within this context, a constitution or government that limits the ability of the political leader to engage in such action should, by inference, be able to limit the level of debt the country accrues. The same inference can be used for government secrecy.
That the coefficient of each of the variables concerned is significant does not necessarily imply that a long-run relationship exists. The bounds test helps decipher the existence of long-run co-movement between the variables. Such a test is one of the advantages of the ARDL estimation technique. It tests for the existence of a long-term relationship between all the variables in the model. In the row reporting the outcome of the bounds test for all five models estimated, we see that only the model in column 5 has an F-statistic = 4.306, which is greater than the upper bound of the critical values provided. This signals the existence of the long-term relationship between all the variables in the model in column 5 and the absence of a long-run relationship between the variables in the model in columns 1 to 4. One possible reason for this could be the loss of degrees of freedom and an inability to allow for many lags in the estimation technique owing to the large number of variables included in the model, as well as the relatively small number of observations (in column 5). The maximum possible lags to be used have to be limited to just two, which then allows for more observations. However, the results need to be treated with circumspection due to the few lag options allowed. Nevertheless, we still see the negative coefficient in respect of the extent of arbitrary executive powers signalling the importance of a check on the executive as a means to curbing excessive debt levels. Table 4 Public and publically guaranteed external debt and institutions Notes: *, ** and ***Represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The critical value bounds for the F-statistics are: 2. 33 -3.25, 2.63 -3.62, 3.27 -4.39, for K = 6; 2.22 -3.17, 2.5 -3.5, 3.07 -4.23, for K = 7; 2.13 -3.09, 2.38 -3.41, 2.93 -4.06 , for K = 8. The first value being the lower bound and the second value is the upper bound. ECM coeff. gives the error correction term for the model, which indicates that the model is okay, and measures the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium. In all the cases, we have significance at the 1% level of significance.
Finally, in the second last row of each of the columns in Table 3 , we report on the errorcorrection term for each model. This value needs to be between −1 and 0 for the model to be valid, otherwise we might have a case of serial correlation, or autocorrelation, in the estimation. For all the models estimated, the ECM term lies between −1 and 0. Furthermore, this term gives us the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium of the debt measure after a shock. In all the columns, we see that the coefficient is relatively large. However, it is highest in column 5, which signals a 46% adjustment back to equilibrium within a year of the shock. While the total external debt measure captures quite adequately the debt status of a country, it is sometimes of benefit to consider an alternative measure. PPG external debt is one measure that directly points to the debt burden inflicted on a country's future taxpayers, as it is directly guaranteed by the government. We use this measure as the dependent variable to see whether the results obtained from the initial analysis presented in Table 3 will remain consistent. The outcome of regressing the same regressors on PPG debt is presented in Table 4 . The only different regressor in these analyses is the interestpayment variable. This has now been adjusted to be interest payments on PPG debt, instead of the interest payment on total external debt. The result in column 1 is similar to the results obtained in column 1 of Table 3 . However, unlike the case of total external debt, in columns 2 to 4 two of the measures significantly influence PPG debt levels in the long-term. Additionally, the results indicate that, in all five models in columns 1 to 5, a long-run relationship exists between the variables and PPG debt, as indicated by the bounds test F-statistic. In addition to this, the variables negatively impact PPG debt in the long run. This means that, as the laws and regulations that reduce government secrecy as well as arbitrary executive powers are being promulgated, the incidence of accruing PPG debt to be paid by future citizens is significantly reduced.
In a similar manner to the output in Table 3 , we see most of the oft-mentioned determinants of debt in the literature having coefficients seemingly inconsistent with theory. For example, in most of the regression outcomes in both Tables 3 and 4 , FDI inflows consistently have a significant and positive effect on debt levels. The same can be said for interest payment, as well as non-oil fiscal balance. What these imply is that, while cross-country studies have in the past pointed to a FDI inflow acting as a substitute for external finance, this is not necessarily the case for all countries. In the case of Nigeria, which has been fraught with high levels of unnecessary debt, the inflow of FDI does not seem to play a role in lowering debt levels. Rather, it seems to exacerbate it. A possible explanation for this may be the preference for foreign finance by foreign owned companies, however, this should not transpire in the public debt analysis. An interesting result, however, is the negative and consistently significant impact of oil rents on debt levels. This can be seen as a possible counterargument to the resource-curse hypothesis. In Nigeria, the high dependence of the federation on oil revenues can mean that during oil price hikes, the revenue is greatly increased, reducing the need for debt, while the opposite would result in increased debts levels.
As a robustness check we use a third measure of debt, namely long-term external debt as a proxy for debt levels. The results in Table 5 indicate an outcome that is even more supportive of the role of institutions in determining long-term external debt. Both government secrecy and arbitrary executive powers have a negative and significant impact on long-term debt levels in the long run. Similarly, civil and political liberties, which constitute a composite measure that is inclusive of both government secrecy and arbitrary executive powers, also have a negative and significant impact on long-term external debt levels. In addition to this, we see that there is an even faster adjustment back to the long-run equilibrium, as evidenced by the ECM coefficients ranging between 43% and 70% within a year.
Conclusions
The debt levels in many sub-Saharan African countries have been a cause for concern for some time now. This has been in the limelight in recent times due to the increased debt levels of many countries that were members of the forgiven highly indebted poor countries (HIPC). While Nigeria was not initially one of these countries due to her wealth of resources, and consequently the income-generating capacity of the said resources, the fall in crude oil prices in the 1970s put Nigeria in a precarious situation debt-wise. In this paper, we set out to explore the debt narrative of Nigeria from an institutions perspective.
In Alesina and Passalacqua's (2015) review of the discourse on the political foundations of government debt, it was highlighted that, while many authors in this area -such as Grilli et al. (1991) , Fabrizio and Mody (2006) , Wehner (2009) and Halac and Yared (2014) -have pointed to the role of institutional features in determining public debt, the results are as yet inconclusive. This is due in part to the inability to make concrete causal claims regarding the role of institutions, and this therefore suggested further enquiry from a historical perspective. This paper adds to such discourse by performing a country-specific, and to some extent historical, inquiry into the possible role of very specific institutional features -government secrecy and the extent of arbitrary executive powers -in untangling public debt determination. We find that, in addition to some of the more prominent and already identified determinants of external debt, such as FDI, GDP growth and foreign reserves, the specific institutional features considered also play a significant role in the long-run determination of debt. This result becomes even more solidified when we zone into a narrower definition of debt. We find evidence of negative and significant long-run influence of civil and political liberties, as well as one of its sub-indicators (arbitrary executive powers) on the level of PPG debt.
Furthermore, we identified that government secrecy does indeed have a significant long-run impact on the level of long-term external debt. In other words, the absence of secrecy does provide a level of accountability not otherwise available within the polity. The same can be said of both arbitrary executive powers and the composite index, civil and political liberties. In all these instances, the consistent observation is that the extent of arbitrary executive powers is an important factor in Nigeria's debt-level determination. Therefore, if Nigeria wishes to develop better fiscal discipline in terms of the nature and manner in which debt are accrued, efficient and adequate checks on the executive need to be instituted. It should be made clear that the measure of institutions adopted for this study is constructed from the de jure aspect of the law. Therefore, it is only concerned with the promulgation of the law and does not capture the enforcement of laws. Thus, it encourages the need for laws promulgated and aimed at curtailing the extent of arbitrary executive powers to be enforced in order for the full effect of such laws to be evident in the way debt is determined.
The three different debt measures have corresponding interest-payment measures, which are labelled Payment 1, Payment 2 and Payment 3, respectively. 3 It is recommended that studies conducting macroeconomic analysis of oil-producing countries should include this variable as a control, as it captures the performance of the non-oil industries in the economy, and hence gives a wholesome view of the fiscal state of the economy -see Zakharova and Medas (2009) and Akanbi (2015) . 4
In the case where there are only two variables considered, p and q being the variables being considered.
